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Preface
Crimes and catastrophes make eye-catching headlines. Stories that in­
clude large sums of money, intrigue, technology, and clever schemes 
are good copy. Frauds involving electronic data processing (EDP) often 
have all these features. Cases such as the $200 million insurance fraud at 
Equity Funding, the $21 million theft at Wells Fargo Bank, the $24 mil­
lion misstatement of revenue at JWT Group, Inc., and the $10 million 
wire transfer theft from Security Pacific National Bank all received na­
tional attention.
These cases share some common characteristics. The perpetrators 
were individuals familiar with the companies’ systems; their objectives 
were to either carry out or conceal financial misdeeds; and they took ad­
vantage of the existing technology.
There has also been press coverage of break-ins to computer systems 
for reasons other than to commit fraud or theft. Although these acts 
point out potential security problems, they are not related to the business 
fraud cases reviewed in this study.
The purpose of this report is to place the problem of EDP-related 
fraud in perspective. Because of the inadequate data available on many 
reported cases, it is difficult to determine what went wrong or how the 
crime could have been prevented. By describing the specifics of how 
several cases were perpetrated, the Task Force hopes to provide infor­
mation that will help EDP users prevent becoming victims of similar 
frauds.
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Introduction
Background
Growth in the use of large integrated data bases, microcomputers, port­
able “intelligent” terminals with access through telecommunications, 
and other evolving technologies, can provide greater susceptibility to 
fraud. The increasing complexity of computer systems and their related 
operations compound the difficulties of preventing and detecting fraud.
The concentration of processing and recording activities in computer 
systems makes the accounting records of some organizations more ac­
cessible and the manipulation of those records and the concealment of 
theft somewhat easier. The decreasing use of hard copy books, records, 
and other documents and decreasing human involvement also facilitates 
concealment. The ability to alter data in computer systems, often with­
out any observable evidence of manipulation, has made it easier to per­
petrate and cover up fraud.
Because of the significant potential for EDP-related fraud, the Ameri­
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), in 1978, ap­
pointed the EDP Fraud Review Task Force to look into the nature and 
pervasiveness of such fraud. The Task Force evaluated several sources 
of information and reviewed several cases in depth. The Task Force was 
unable to obtain significant information from existing or potentially 
available sources. This was primarily due to a lack of consistent, com­
prehensive, reliable data and a reluctance or inability of the sources to 
disclose significant facts.
To obtain information for analysis, a study consisting of two industry 
surveys was undertaken, focusing attention on the variety of fraud sce­
narios to provide a basis for evaluating the range of conditions through 
which EDP-related frauds may occur. The focus of this study was on the 
who, what, where, when, why, and how of specific EDP-related fraud 
cases rather than on projections of the number of cases or the dollar size 
of those cases. For this reason, readers are cautioned not to generalize or
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draw conclusions on the incidence or dollar magnitude of EDP-related 
frauds based on the results of this study.
The extent of EDP-related fraud may not be quantifiable for a variety 
of reasons. There is a lack of reliable data. Available data is frequently 
based on news coverage. Legal constraints prevent comprehensive anal­
ysis of some cases until court proceedings are complete. Not all reports 
of fraud accurately distinguish frauds related to EDP, and, in fact, there 
is no general agreement on the definition of EDP-related fraud. There is 
also a general reluctance of many companies to disclose information 
about fraud.
Furthermore, determining the size of the problem may be affected by 
the following factors. First, several cases of EDP-related fraud continue 
for long periods of time —  some for many years —  before they are de­
tected. Some may never be detected; thus, undetected frauds are likely 
to exist, but their number and magnitude are unknown. Second, many 
EDP-related frauds are discovered accidentally. Thus, the dollar amount 
of reported frauds merely states the minimum amount; the potential total 
loss is considerably higher. Third, the amount of the loss may be stated 
either before or after restitution, or it may be the amount manipulated or 
only the actual amount extracted.
Auditors’ Concern with EDP-Related Fraud
Traditionally, independent auditors have been engaged to lend credibil­
ity to the financial statements they examine. Users of those audited fi­
nancial statements expect that they can reasonably rely on such state­
ments for making economic decisions. Therefore, auditors are 
concerned about matters that can materially affect the reliability of the 
financial statements under examination.
Fraud or irregularities could have a material effect on the financial 
statements. The AICPA’s position on auditors’ responsibilities for the 
detection of fraud is stated in Statement on Auditing Standards No. 16:1
Under generally accepted auditing standards the independent auditor has 
the responsibility, within the inherent limitations of the auditing process 
. . ., to plan his examination . . .  to search for errors or irregularities that 
would have a material effect on the financial statements, and to exercise 
due skill and care in the conduct of that examination . . . .  An indepen­
1AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 16, The Independent Auditor’s Re­
sponsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregularities (New York: AICPA, 1977), 
paragraph 5.
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dent auditor’s standard report implicitly indicates his belief that the finan­
cial statements taken as a whole are not materially misstated as a result of 
errors or irregularities.* 2 (emphasis added)
Because information used in the preparation of financial statements is 
often processed by computers, auditors are concerned with errors and 
irregularities that might occur during computer processing that could 
have a material effect on the financial statements.
Definition of EDP-Related Fraud
The Task Force’s definition of EDP-related fraud used for this study was 
“any intentional act, or series of acts, that is designed to deceive or 
mislead others and that has an impact or potential impact on an organiza­
tion’s financial statements. EDP must be involved in the perpetration or 
cover-up of the act or series of acts.” This definition has three essential 
characteristics.
1. The existence o f fraud. A good definition of fraud is that given in the 
report of the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities:3
Viewed broadly, any intentional act designed to deceive or mislead others 
is fraud. Fraud in the business environment with which the auditor is 
concerned has a more specialized meaning. Fraud may occur at the 
employee or management level. Frauds by nonmanagement employees 
are generally designed to convert cash or other assets to an employee’s 
own benefit. . . . Fraud at the management level includes intentional 
misrepresentations that may lead to improper selection of accounting 
principles or inclusion of false amounts in, or the omission of amounts 
from, financial statements. It is usually accompanied by acts of conceal­
ment, such as omission of entries, manipulation of documents (including 
forgery), or collusion among individuals inside or outside the company.
2. An impact on the financial statements. Fraud can affect financial 
statements in a variety of ways:
•  Theft, impairment, or misrepresentation of assets
•  Misrepresentation, omission, or concealment of liabilities or 
equities
•  Manipulation or misrepresentation of revenue or expenses
2Irregularities are defined by SAS No. 16 as intentional distortions of financial state­
ments or misappropriations of assets.
3Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions, and Recommenda­
tions (New York: AICPA, 1978), page 32.
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3. Involvement o f EDP. The third and essential characteristic of the 
definition of EDP-related fraud used for the study is that EDP must 
be directly involved in the perpetration or cover-up of the scheme. 
EDP may be directly involved by any improper manipulation of:
Input or transaction data — Manipulations may occur when unau­
thorized data are prepared for input to a computer system or when 
authorized input is improperly altered, duplicated, destroyed, or 
withheld.
Output or results — Manipulations may happen when reports, files, 
or other output are mislabeled, misrepresented, altered, or misdeliv­
ered to effect a fraud or cover-up.
Application programs — Manipulations may be accomplished by 
the development of unauthorized programs, or segments of pro­
grams, or by the subsequent alteration of once-acceptable programs 
or documentation.
Data files — Manipulations may happen when files are directly 
changed without transactions, such as through the use of file utilities 
or on-line terminal access.
Computer operations — Manipulations may result from the deliber­
ate misuse of the computer system operations such as the use of the 
wrong programs, data files or transactions, or the interruption of 
normal program processing.
Communications — Manipulations may happen by intervention in 
the process of data being sent between terminals and the computer or 
between two or more computers.
Computer hardware, systems software or firmware — Manipula­
tions may happen by improper use, alteration, or intervention in the 
functioning of these resources.
Other definitions of EDP-related fraud have included theft of software, 
hardware, or data; theft of computer time; and errors (made without the 
intent to deceive). The definition used for this study specifically ex­
cluded those occurrences, as well as other computer crimes or abuses, 
such as the destruction of computer software or hardware or illegal 
access to telecommunications or computer systems without the intent to 
commit fraud.
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The Study
To study EDP-related fraud, surveys were conducted in the banking and 
insurance industries in cooperation with the Bank Administration Insti­
tute, the American Insurance Association, the American Council of Life 
Insurance, and the Life Office Management Association. These indus­
tries were selected because both are highly automated, both deal in 
liquid assets, and the operations of entities within each industry are 
fairly similar.
Similar questionnaires were sent to banks and insurance companies. 
No respondent identification techniques were used, although respon­
dents were invited to identify themselves to permit follow-up inquiry. In 
some cases, the Task Force contacted banks and insurance companies 
that had identified themselves, to obtain additional information to 
complete the analysis.
It should be noted that survey participation was voluntary. The Task 
Force was aware of some significant cases that were not reported 
through the surveys and could, therefore, not be included in the study.
Of the 9,405 banks surveyed, 5,127 responded, yielding a response 
rate of 55 percent. Of those responding, 105 reported they had experi­
enced at least one case of what was believed to be EDP-related fraud and 
submitted information on one of their cases. After reviewing the details 
of all reported cases, it was determined that 85 conformed to the study 
definition.
The insurance company questionnaire was sent to 1,232 companies, 
429 were casualty-property insurance companies, and 803 were life and 
health insurance companies. A total of 854 responded, for a response 
rate of 69 percent. The respondents identified 40 cases they believed to 
be EDP-related fraud. Of the cases submitted, 34 conformed to the 
study definition.
The data and analyses provided in the following sections, although 
presented in some cases in a numerical format, are not intended to 
present conclusions about the incidence or magnitude but rather on the 
general nature and means of committing some EDP-related frauds.
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Summary of Findings
The 119 cases identified in the surveys of EDP-related fraud in the 
banking and insurance industries provide useful information for devis­
ing strategies for preventing and detecting EDP-related fraud. The 
results of the surveys are categorized to answer the following questions:
•  What was the environment in which the frauds were committed?
•  What was the general nature of the frauds, and how were they 
committed?
•  Who committed the frauds, why, and what corrective action was 
taken?
•  How were the frauds detected?
What Was the Environment in Which the 
Frauds Were Committed?
In almost all cases, the fraud occurred during normal transaction proc­
essing cycles. The type of computer system was not significant. Also, 
fraud occurred in both batch and on-line systems. It should be noted, 
however, that at the time of the surveys the insurance industry used on­
line systems more than the banking industry did. This accounts for some 
industry differences in the analyses. Many types of application systems 
were subject to manipulation.
What Was the General Nature of the Frauds, 
and How Were They Committed?
Perpetrators employed a variety of schemes, methods, and techniques. 
Relatively few perpetrators used sophisticated techniques; many took 
advantage of weaknesses in the system of internal accounting control. 
Inadequate segregation of duties was a common weakness in the re­
ported frauds.
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Most frauds were perpetrated in the input area; perpetrators generally 
introduced or created unauthorized input or manipulated otherwise 
proper input. File maintenance was a fairly common method used by 
perpetrators; in all but one of these cases, the file maintenance manipu­
lation involved nonfinancial data (for example, extending due dates on 
loans, changing names and addresses).
A specific area worthy of mention is the importance of control over 
access codes and passwords and, specifically in banking, the availabil­
ity of personal identification numbers and the plastic cards needed to 
access automated teller machines.
In some cases, there appears to have been no significant attempt at 
concealment. It appears that the perpetrator may have relied on a large 
volume of transactions to cause the fraudulent transaction to be “lost.” 
In other cases, perpetrators attempted to conceal their frauds by altering 
names and addresses to divert normal customer correspondence. Sev­
eral cases involved over 100 transactions, but in one case, several 
million dollars was taken in a single transaction.
Losses from the reported cases ranged up to several million dollars, 
although the majority involved amounts of $25,000 or less. The amount 
of the loss is before any restitution.
Who Committed the Frauds, Why, and What 
Corrective Action Was Taken?
The cases showed the range of perpetrators covered almost every aspect 
of corporate operations, with the preponderance outside the EDP area. 
Most perpetrators in the banking industry were either data entry clerks 
or loan officers. In the insurance industry, most were claim processors 
or policy service clerks. Where perpetrators were supervisors or man­
agement personnel, their schemes generally lasted longer and involved 
larger dollar amounts.
In several cases, accomplices were used to receive or negotiate funds; 
but, in virtually all of these cases, they were not necessary to perpetrate 
the fraud.
The primary objective of most perpetrators was to take money from 
the bank or insurance company; however, some perpetrators manipu­
lated data to show a better record of performance (for example, one 
bank loan officer extended due dates on loans to show a good record of 
loan collections).
In virtually all cases, perpetrators were employees and were later 
dismissed from employment. In the majority of the cases, legal action
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was taken or was pending. In many cases, restitution was made or was in 
process.
How Were the Frauds Detected?
According to the respondents, the cases were detected by the following
means:
1. Methods of detection:
•  In approximately one-third of the cases, the systems of internal 
accounting control or routine internal or external audits uncovered 
the fraud.
•  Approximately another one-third of the cases were detected 
through nonroutine events (such as, accident, unusual activity of 
perpetrator, or tip-off).
2. Sources of detection:
•  In the majority of the cases, people uncovering the frauds were 
within the company (that is, other employees, middle manage­
ment, and internal auditors).
•  In about one-fourth of the cases, customer complaints were 
mostly the source within the first three months. Virtually all these 
cases occurred in the banking industry; in the insurance industry, 
policyholders usually were not aware that fraudulent transactions 
had been processed against their policies.
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Analysis of Reported Cases
Selected characteristics of each EDP-related fraud and perpetrator were 
identified and summarized to present a composite profile of the 119 
cases reported by the survey respondents (85 bank cases and 34 insur­
ance cases). This section contains tables and explanations of these 
analyses.
Application Systems Affected
The application system is the primary area of operations affected by the 
fraud. Listed below, by industry, are the applications reported affected 
by the 119 cases, from most to least frequently affected.
Table 1 — Application System
Banking
•  Demand Deposits
•  Proof and Transit
•  Installment Loans
•  Credit Card Loans
•  Savings Accounts
•  Commercial Loans
•  Automated Teller Machines
•  Check Credit
•  Cash Control
•  Mortgage Loans
•  Wire Transfer
Insurance
•  Accident and Health Claims
•  Property and Casualty Premiums
•  Life Insurance
Premiums/Commissions
•  Policy Loans
•  Property and Casualty Claims
•  Life Insurance Dividends,
Surrenders (Cancellations), 
and Other Transactions
Banking Applications
Demand deposits are checking accounts.
Proof and transit is the verification and balancing of daily bank trans-
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actions, accounting distribution of those transactions, and collection of 
checks and drafts payable at or through other banks.
Installment loans are single disbursement, often consumer, loans that 
are repaid through regular payments.
Credit card loans are revolving credit lines available to bank credit 
card holders.
Savings accounts refers to relatively low-rate interest-bearing de­
posits.
Commercial loans are typically single payment loans.
Automated teller machines (ATM) allow customers to deposit, with­
draw, or transfer funds, remotely, without the involvement of a bank 
employee. For purposes of analysis, ATM has been categorized as a 
special application, distinct from the cash application.
Check credit refers to revolving credit activated by writing checks 
and overdrafts.
Cash control is the cash balancing function performed by tellers.
Mortgage loans are generally collateralized long-term loans.
Wire transfers are the instantaneous, electronic movements of, fre­
quently, large amounts from accounts at the bank to other banks.
Insurance Applications
Accident and health claims cover recording, approving, and paying 
claims for medical expenses under group or individual accident or 
health insurance policies.
Property and casualty premiums includes processing of premium 
billings, endorsements, refunds, and cancellations.
Life insurance premiums/commissions covers processing of billings 
and adjustments, as well as commissions due to agents.
Policy loans refers to loans made against the cash surrender value of 
life insurance policies.
Property and casualty claims includes recording, approving, and 
paying claims for damages to property, liability for damages to the prop­
erty of others, or injuries to others.
Life insurance dividends, surrenders (cancellations), and other trans­
actions have been grouped together for purposes of this analysis.
Schemes
Scheme is the fraudulent activity used by the perpetrator to effect the 
fraud. The accompanying table lists the schemes reported by industry, 
from most to least frequent.
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Table 2 — Scheme
Banking Insurance
Banking Schemes
In the cases of fraud in the banking industry, misposting or misdirecting 
customer deposits, often to the perpetrator’s own account, was most fre­
quent. Other frequently used schemes included crediting loans to bor­
rowers who never received the funds, or who, in fact, may never have 
existed. In several cases, perpetrators made unauthorized extensions of 
credit limits and loan due dates. They changed the due dates on their 
own loans, or they changed the due date on loans for which they were 
responsible to make their job performance look better.
Insurance Schemes
The most frequently used scheme in the insurance industry was generat­
ing claim payments to the perpetrator or to accomplices. Another promi­
nent scheme was generating refunds or reductions of policy premiums, 
for example, by authorizing refund checks after changing policyholder 
names and addresses, or by cancelling policies to automatically gener­
ate policy refund checks (the checks were forged and the policies were 
later reinstated).
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Divert customer funds into per­
petrator’s own account 
Make unauthorized extensions of 
credit limits, loan due dates 
Create fictitious loans 
Defer recording of perpetrator’s 
own checks and charges 
Forge customer input documents 
(checks and withdrawals) 
Make ATM extractions 
Make adjustments to customer 
deposits
Divert loan payments into perpe­
trator’s own account 
Divert customer income to per­
petrator’s own account 
Wire transfer
Create fictitious claims 
Trigger unauthorized refund or 
reduction of premiums 
Create unauthorized policy loans 
Trigger unauthorized dividend 
withdrawals 
Forge checks
Create unauthorized mortgage 
loans
Reinstate lapsed policies 
Create fictitious pension 
payments
Methods
Method identifies what the perpetrator did to the automated system to 
initiate and carry out the fraud. Several perpetrators employed multiple 
methods. In these cases, the analysis identified the one method that was 
most instrumental in carrying out the fraud. Table 3 lists the methods 
used, which were similar in the banking and insurance industries.
Table 3 — Method
Method Banking Insurance
Transactions manipulation to:
Create original items 16 18
Divert or capture items 21 2
Force or divert rejects 14 -
Subtotals 51 20
File maintenance changes:
Nonfinancial fields 23 13
Financial fields 1 -
Subtotals 24 13
Direct file changes 6 1
Other _4
Totals 85 34
Creation of original items includes initiating transfers from customer 
accounts to the perpetrator’s account, making adjustments to their own 
accounts, creating loans, submitting fraudulent claims, requesting pol­
icy loans, initiating policy dividends or refunds.
Diverting or capturing items includes incorrectly encoding or altering 
the encoding of items to be posted to customer deposits, assets, or fee 
income. Also, items such as premium receipts or the perpetrator’s own 
checks were removed from normal processing.
To force or divert rejects, perpetrators altered magnetic ink character 
recognition encoding. For example, a bookkeeper changed the check 
digit on deposits thus interfering with their timely processing and 
permitting a deposit lapping scheme. Other perpetrators also incorrectly 
encoded previously rejected items to misdirect deposits or to capture 
items to prevent further processing.
File maintenance changes involved making unauthorized changes to 
computer-based master files. This included increasing credit limits,
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changing dates, opening credit or loan accounts, reactivating closed 
accounts, changing names and addresses, and reinstating lapsed poli­
cies.
Direct file changes involved changing master files without any associ­
ated transaction processing or file maintenance, for example, by the 
misuse of file utility routines.
Procedures
Procedure describes how the perpetrator manipulated the automated 
system to allow the methods to work. Table 4 lists the procedures the 
perpetrators followed.
Table 4 — Procedure
Procedure Banking Insurance
Prepared forms or documents improperly 
Unauthorized on-line transactions, input,
34 18
or access 11 15
Prepared EDP-media improperly 
Altered forms or documents authorized by
24 —
someone else 7 -
Manipulated EDP-media 5 1
Unauthorized program alterations 3 -
Manipulated EDP output 1 -
Totals 85 34
In both industries, the perpetrators, generally, either introduced 
unauthorized transactions or altered or manipulated authorized 
transactions.
In nearly half the cases, input forms were prepared improperly, for 
example, file maintenance forms or claim data forms. In a number of 
other cases, on-line terminals were used to input unauthorized transac­
tions, file maintenance entries, or to gain information necessary to 
effect the fraud (for example, through inquiry routines). The cases of 
improper preparation of EDP-media involved proof operators, key­
punch operators, or machine operators, intentionally misposting or 
miskeying transactions or misusing suspense accounts, inter-branch 
transactions, or adjustments. The absence of cases in this third category 
in the insurance industry is a reflection of the significance of on-line 
processing.
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Perpetrators
Perpetrator refers to the position of the person mainly responsible for 
the fraud. Table 5 lists the reported perpetrator, by industry, in order of 
frequency.
Table 5 — Perpetrator
Banking
•  Clerks (data entry, proof machine
operators, other)
•  Managers (loan officers)
•  Data processors (operators,
systems and application 
programmers)
•  Tellers
•  Item processors
Insurance
•  Clerks (claim processors, policy
service, other)
•  Supervisors (claims, policy
service, other)
•  Insurance agents
•  Systems programmers
Clerical personnel were the most frequent perpetrators reported in 
both industries. They often had many opportunities to perpetrate a fraud 
by altering, rejecting, or otherwise incorrectly processing items, as well 
as by introducing unauthorized items. In the banking industry, they 
generally included data entry clerks and proof machine operators; in the 
insurance industry, claim processors and policy service clerks.
In the banking industry, perpetrators reported at the clerical level 
were more likely to be involved in frauds in the checking, proof and 
transit, and savings areas. In the insurance industry, clerical personnel 
usually focused on claims.
The next most prominent category of perpetrator reported was mid­
level management or supervisory personnel. In banking, the manage­
ment personnel were generally loan officers who initiated fictitious 
loans or extended loan due dates. In the insurance industry, manage­
ment personnel were generally clerical supervisors using any of the 
applications including premiums, claims, and loans.
Computer personnel (systems and applications programmers and 
operators) were also moderately prominent in banking, but to a lesser 
extent in insurance. Computer personnel tended to focus on diversion of 
funds in banking. However in the insurance study, a systems program­
mer changed certain parameters concerning his own policy.
The most common objective of the perpetrators in both industries was 
theft of assets. To a lesser extent, some perpetrators sought to manipu­
late information used by management or even the financial statements,
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in order to present better performance records. Occasionally a fraud was 
perpetrated primarily for self-satisfaction.
Fraud Size
The emphasis of these studies focused on the circumstances of the fraud 
rather than the dollar magnitude of individual cases. Nevertheless, the 
accompanying table shows an interesting relationship between the size 
of the fraud and the perpetrator’s position. (The dollar size is the gross 
amount manipulated rather than only the amount actually extracted and 
is before any restitution.)
Table 6 — Number of Cases by Dollar Range 
(thousands)
Perpetrator Under $25
Banking cases
Clerical 37
Managers 7
Data processors 9
Tellers 5
Others _5
63
Insurance cases
Clerical 17
Supervisors 2
Others 1
20
More than
$26-$100 $100 Total
1 38
4 6 17
2 2 13
2 1 8
_2 _2 _9
10 12 85
3 1 21
2 5 9
2 1  _4
7 7 34
Management and supervisory level personnel tended to be responsible 
for the larger frauds, and clerical level personnel tended to be responsi­
ble for the smaller frauds. In one case, a pension supervisor was able 
to extract $400,000 because he had complete control over payment 
transactions and related correspondence with contract holders and 
claimants.
Duration
Duration of the fraud refers to the length of time the fraudulent activity 
was occurring.
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Table 7 — Relationship of Duration to Perpetrator
Number of Cases Lasting
Perpetrator
Banking cases 
Clerical
Supervisors/managers 
EDP personnel 
Others
Insurance cases 
Clerical
Supervisors/managers 
EDP personnel 
Others
Less Than 1 to 12
1 Month Months
8 36
1 6
5 7
_ 1 1
15 50
4 13
- 3
- 1
- _2
4 19
More than
12 Months Total
1 51
12 19
- 12
1 _3
20 85
4 21
6 9
- 1
1 _3
11 34
Frauds perpetrated by supervisory or management personnel tended to 
last longer than those perpetrated by clerical personnel. In one case, a 
claim supervisor was able to extract money over five years because he 
had access to subordinates’ passwords, could submit false claims for 
clerks to process, and could access terminals to change master file data.
Concealment
In several cases no significant attempt to conceal the fraud was apparent, 
such as a one-shot extraction of funds with no effort to cover up. Perpe­
trators appear to have been relying on the possibility that fraudulent 
transactions would be “overlooked” or “lost” in the larger volume of 
transactions normally processed or would simply be written off as un­
reconciled items.
When attempts at concealment had been made, the effort usually in­
volved using file maintenance transactions or destroying or “mislay­
ing” source documents or output documents. Frequently, addresses 
used for mailing customer bank statements or policyholder change 
notices were changed so that fraudulent transactions would not come to 
a customer’s attention. In one case, a policy service clerk used a termi­
nal and an error correction routine to reverse the effect of file main­
tenance changes submitted earlier to perpetrate the fraud. In another
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case, computer-generated policyholder cancellation notices were 
destroyed. In still others, error or reject listings were destroyed or
“mislaid.”
Detection
According to the respondents, the methods and sources of detection of 
the fraud were as follows.
Method of Detection
Method o f detection identifies the event or factor that triggered the de­
tection of the fraud.
Table 8 — Method of Detection
Method
Control and audit
Banking Insurance
Internal controls 12 10
Routine audit 17 4
Customer complaint/inquiry 
Unusual or non-routine events 
Accident, tip-off, unusual
24 4
activity of perpetrator 11 15
Non-routine study 
Change in operations, 
EDP, or financial
8 1
statements 7 -
Unidentified  6 ~
Totals 85 34
Complaints from customers were much more significant to the detection 
of the fraud in banking (particularly in the checking and deposit areas) 
due to frequent correspondence with customers. For frauds of short du­
ration (less than four months), customer complaint/inquiry was the most 
significant factor in detecting the frauds. In one case, after a clerk with­
drew funds from a customer’s account, the clerk intercepted the cus­
tomer’s statements. The customer complained after one statement 
slipped through.
Frauds perpetrated with file maintenance changes were usually de­
tected through internal accounting controls and audit. Frauds perpe­
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trated by manipulating transactions were detected almost equally by 
control and audit, customer complaint/inquiry, and accident.
Source of Detection
Source o f detection identifies who first discovered the fraud (or caused 
the fraud to be discovered).
Table 9 — Source of Detection
Source 
Other employees 
Middle management 
Internal auditors 
Customers
External auditors/examiners 
Other/unidentified 
Totals
Banking Insurance
23 16
20 7
20 5
16 -
4 —
_2 _6
85 34
Other employees, including substitute clerks, accounting clerks, and 
mail clerks, among others, made up the single most significant group in 
detecting fraud.
The following appendix contains details of selected cases. These 
cases were selected to illustrate the wide range of fraud scenarios de­
scribed in the surveys.
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APPENDIX
Sampling of Cases From the Study
(all am ounts are approxim ate)
Banking Cases
1. A data entry clerk manipulated the automated central information file 
that permitted debit cards to access unrelated customer accounts through 
automatic teller machines. Over 100 transactions totaling $25,000 were made 
within a period of less than two months. Numerous customer complaints were 
received about unauthorized ATM withdrawals against their accounts. These 
complaints triggered an investigation that discovered the fraud.
2. A computer operator using a card-driven system prepared a false set of 
ledger cards that increased his checking account balance and decreased a large 
business checking account balance, which had reached $90,000. Each month at 
statement preparation time, accurate statements were prepared for the customer 
using the correct ledger cards. After several years, the fraud was detected by an 
employee researching another account.
3. A data entry clerk responsible for reviewing all maintenance changes on 
installment loans changed the due date on his own loan. He was thereby able to 
extend the loan five to ten times and not make any payments. The total amount 
of the loan was $3,500. When the employee was transferred, he could no longer 
make the extensions. The loan became past due, and the fraud was discovered.
4. Unauthorized extensions of payment due dates were made over a three- 
year period to loans of approximately $1 million. The perpetrator, a member of 
senior management, thereby hid delinquencies and showed a better lending and 
collection record. The extensions were made by master file changes prepared 
by the individual, who would then remove the change forms when the work was 
returned from the service bureau. Regulatory examiners made an investigation 
when they noted there were loans shown as current without payments made or 
extension fees charged.
5. A data entry clerk obtained a customer’s credit card and personal 
identification number from returned mail. He then raised the credit limit on the
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terminal and obtained cash from an automatic teller machine. Over a five month 
period $3,000 was obtained. The customer was not aware of this, as the clerk 
intercepted the statements. When one statement did get to the customer, the 
customer’s complaint triggered the detection.
6. An applications programmer analyst increased his bank account and 
reduced a customer’s account by a file manipulation, the specific mechanism of 
which was not disclosed. The fraud was discovered when the customer com­
plained. The period of concealment was less than a month and the total amount 
was under $1,000.
7. A proof clerk correcting rejected items keyed in a false credit to his own 
checking account, using a CRT terminal. The total amount involved was under 
$300, and the period of concealment was less than one month. One of the false 
credits he entered was not offset by a debit. This caused an out-of-balance 
situation that was traced to his account. Subsequent investigation disclosed the 
nature and scope of the fraud.
8. A computer operator increased the balance on his own checking account 
ledger card and decreased the balances for two other accounts. At statement 
time, he would reverse all the changes so the statements sent out would be 
correct.
The total amount involved in this fraud was less than $1,000 and it was 
concealed for two months. The fraud was detected by the EDP manager when 
he came into work early one day and supervised the preparation of statements 
before the operator had a chance to replace the improper cards. A system check 
that recalculated the statement balance then flagged the accounts as out-of­
balance.
9. An officer who supervised operations at a branch withheld savings 
deposits from customer savings accounts and took cash or credited his own 
account as an offset. The perpetrator occasionally filled in as a teller and would 
sell money orders and never record them as outstanding. When a complaint was 
made by a customer that a deposit had not been entered, the perpetrator entered 
a correction charging another account with the offset. Sometimes he took cash 
and offset the shortage by creating an inter-branch clearing. When no response 
to such entries were made after five to six days by other branches, the amounts 
were transferred to the branch’s suspense account. The perpetrator also con­
trolled that account. For the month-end balancing they were charged to another 
suspense account and then transferred back after the balancing.
Concealment lasted thirteen months, and the total amount was $800,000. 
The EDP system was used in processing the entries and in transferring the 
entries from account to account thereby causing them to lose their identity. The 
fraud was discovered when the perpetrator was transferred to another branch. 
Subsequently, a customer complained about a charge to his savings account that 
had not been authorized. The fraudulent item was traced by another employee 
who found that an embezzlement had occurred.
10. The cashier of this bank was able to extend loan due dates to avoid 
disclosure of delinquent accounts and to conceal poor lending practices. The
20
total amount of the loans involved was $500,000. The fraud took place for a 
year. It was discovered by a loan secretary who inquired about the recurring 
maintenance changes extending loan due dates. Apparently, no funds were 
actually taken.
11. A teller misappropriated cash payments made on loans and then ex­
tended the due dates so the loans would not show up as past due. The extensions 
were made by preparing file maintenance change sheets. After the maintenance 
instructions were acted on, the individual destroyed the sheets. The total 
amount involved was $3,000 and the fraud was concealed for six months. The 
fraud was discovered by the auditors when they confirmed loan balances with 
borrowers.
12. A credit card clerk established fictitious card accounts and credit limits. 
The accounts were created, addresses changed, credit lines increased, and 
closed accounts reactivated by terminal entry. The cards were used for cash 
advances and for purchases. A total of $20,000 was involved; the period of 
concealment was two months. Collectors became involved in investigating 
some of these accounts for which statements were returned by the post office or 
that had exceeded their credit line. Research on undelivered statements re­
vealed that the accounts lacked authorization and supporting documentation. 
Further investigation identified the perpetrator and the nature of the fraud.
13. A note clerk working with a customer as an accomplice changed that 
customer’s overdraft limit via on-line terminal input. The maintenance code to 
do this was supposedly known only by senior management. Approvals were 
forged on the input document. This customer was then allowed to draw up to 
$6,000 against the improperly authorized credit line. The fraud was concealed 
for three months. Payments were made by other unauthorized advances that 
were not properly shown on the reconciliation of the account. The accomplice 
made the mistake of calling the bank several times inquiring about the amount 
of his credit limit. This aroused the suspicion of the note supervisor, who 
couldn’t understand why a customer would call several times concerning his 
credit limit. Upon investigation, it was found that the $6,000 credit limit had 
not been properly approved. Further investigation identified the scheme and the 
perpetrators.
14. The money transfer department received instructions from an imposter 
to transfer $5 million. The imposter identified himself as an employee of a 
branch and stated that he had received instructions from a customer to transfer 
the money to another institution for further transfer to that institution’s cus­
tomer. The test code reported by the imposter for that date and branch were 
correct, thereby not causing suspicion. The following morning the customer, 
upon receiving notification of the transaction, disputed the item and denied 
authorizing it. Upon inquiry, the branch reported that they never issued such 
instructions.
15. In this case, a branch manager and a computer operator colluded to 
extract cash from an automatic teller machine. The branch manager stole the 
money from the machine while the computer operator destroyed logs and
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records of transactions transmitted from the machine to the computer center. 
The money was taken in small amounts over a period of four months. Between 
10 and 100 shortages were involved totaling $3,500. An investigation of the 
cash shortages revealed the scheme between the branch manager and the 
computer operator. The fraud was concealed for four months.
16. An applications programmer using a terminal altered the computer 
programs governing the bank’s cash management service. This program auto­
matically triggered reports of excess funds, which were then to be transferred 
by wire to another bank. Very likely, they were credited to his own account 
rather than wired elsewhere. The fraud was discovered within a month because 
the fraudulent transfers caused overdrafts to customers’ accounts. When the 
overdraft unit investigated disputed transactions, it discovered differences 
between the customer’s instructions and the automatic charges. After the 
internal audit department investigated, the scheme and the perpetrator were 
identified. Between five and ten transactions were involved. The total amount 
of the fraud was $600,000, but no money was extracted from the bank. The
period of concealment was less than a month.
17. Fictitious commercial loans were set up by a branch manager by creating 
false input documents. New fictitious loans were created eventually to pay off 
older fictitious loans. In those cases where a demand loan had been created, he 
paid interest to keep the loan current. The perpetrator input file maintenance 
changes to ensure that all bank mail pertinent to the fictitious loans would be 
routed to post office boxes he controlled.
The fraud was discovered by audit confirmation and by a customer’s com­
plaint of irregularities at the branch. The auditors investigated loan confirma­
tions returned by borrowers whose addresses were listed as post office boxes. 
Checking the signatures on the confirmations, the auditors found them to be 
questionable in comparison with the bank’s signature card files. Further com­
munication with the people listed as borrowers uncovered the fraud. The total 
amount was $120,000. It was concealed for five years, and over 100 transac­
tions were involved.
18. The EDP manager made program alterations causing activity on his 
account to be suppressed from the detail on overdraft reports although the total 
was correct. He also made a change to ensure that no statement would be 
prepared for his account. All of the checking programs were changed to avoid 
his account. Checks that were paid against his account would be removed from 
the files before they were filmed. The account became overdrawn, but it was 
never reported as such. Since no statement was ever prepared, no one became 
aware of the overdraft in the normal course of operations. In this way, the EDP 
manager was able to set up a potentially unlimited overdraft line for himself. 
The fraud was detected by running internal audit software independently 
against the files. The fraud was concealed for a period of six and one-half years. 
The total amount of the overdraft accumulated to $40,000 and involved over 
100 items.
19. A data entry clerk used a CRT terminal to set up a fraudulent revolving 
credit line for a check/credit account in his name. The credit line was never
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properly authorized. The perpetrator then drew the full amount of the credit line 
and deposited this amount to his account. Access to the computer terminal was 
not restricted. Computer reports of the new loans set up were not reviewed.
The total amount of the fraud amounted to $6,000. The period of conceal­
ment was five months. It was detected when one of his transactions was rejected 
due to a systems change (requiring that loan cycle dates and checking statement 
cycle dates coincide). Investigation found that his credit line was not 
authorized.
20. An applications programmer-analyst used a vendor-supplied utility pro­
gram to make two fraudulent transfers from customer savings accounts into his 
own. The total fraudulently transferred was $10,000. The perpetrator then 
withdrew the entire $10,000 from his account the next day.
At the time of the fraud, the bank was undergoing a major systems conver­
sion. During this conversion, programmers were allowed to routinely enter the 
computer room to operate and test programs. Since the bank’s savings system 
was in a conversion mode, the audit department of the bank had been watching 
exception transaction reports very closely. The bank’s daily reporting systems 
identified large transactions against savings accounts. On this day, the auditors 
noted a large $10,000 withdrawal from an account that reported a previous 
day’s balance of only $3. They also noted that no $10,000 deposit transaction 
had been recorded simultaneously. This unusual withdrawal, without an offset­
ting deposit should have caused an overdraft. Upon investigation, it was deter­
mined that the account belonged to an employee of the computer service center.
21. An operations officer in the charge card department would divert cus­
tomer payments to his own account by keying in his account number on pay­
ment processing documents. The perpetrator’s duties included investigation of 
customer complaints. If he received a complaint on one of the defrauded ac­
counts, he entered a payment to that account and debited a suspense account. 
Suspense debits were lapped to further confuse the trail. After the perpetrator 
quit the bank, subsequent customer complaints were investigated and led to dis­
covery of the fraud. The fraud was concealed for one year and totalled $3,000.
22. An operations officer increased his own credit line without authority via 
computer terminal entry. The bank had a terminal system that allowed account 
information inquiries to be made on-line. Later, a system change allowed for 
direct terminal update of certain “nonmonetary” fields that included credit line 
limits. The perpetrator was then able to raise the line of credit on his account 
and draw the limit. A routine audit test later revealed that this account exceeded 
its original credit limit. Subsequent investigation found that his unauthorized 
entry via computer terminal had raised the credit limit. The perpetrator later 
repaid the loan. The total amount of the line withdrawn was $500, and the 
fraudulent loan was in effect four months before being detected.
23. A computer operator, using direct access to the master files through a 
computer console, transferred deposit balances from inactive accounts into ac­
counts controlled by customers with whom he was in collusion. The EDP man­
ager also cooperated in the scheme. The funds were withdrawn from the recipi­
ent account by the accomplices. The computer operator hoped to conceal the
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frauds by changing the balances during statement preparation. This was to be 
done by raising the forwarded balance. He chose relatively inactive accounts to 
further minimize the chance of detection. Finally, he made some unauthorized 
transfers to accounts owned by persons uninvolved in the scheme to further 
confuse the situation in case an investigation developed. After a month and a 
half, however, a customer did complain that his statement balance had been 
reduced without any transaction being posted. An investigation revealed that 
the “error” was caused by direct console intervention.
24. An applications programmer, who also functioned as an operator, devel­
oped a software program to decrease balances in selected inactive accounts and 
increase the balance in his own account. No transactions were input, but the 
files were directly changed. Cycle codes were also altered to ensure that state­
ments would not be mailed until the perpetrator could intercept them. The per­
petrator then prepared falsified statements and mailed them to the customers. In 
one case, the post office returned a falsified statement to the bank, and the per­
petrator then didn’t bother anymore with preparing statements for the customer. 
This customer, however, came in and asked for his statement. A subsequent 
investigation revealed the fraud and identified the perpetrator. The fraud was 
concealed for a period of 13 months and involved between 11 and 100 items. 
The total amount misappropriated was $25,000.
Insurance Cases
25. A policy service clerk obtained a management-level password and used 
it to submit file maintenance transactions to reverse surrendered policies on the 
master file and to update dividend fields. Policies were later surrendered again 
and checks made payable to the clerk’s spouse. The clerk also manipulated a 
loan on an active policy, which led to detection of the schemes when the policy­
holder questioned a loan transaction in response to a confirmation. A follow-up 
inquiry revealed the improper transactions in the policy adjustment and dis­
bursement areas. The schemes lasted about three months and amounted to 
$6 ,000.
26. A policy service supervisor held back incoming cash premium receipts 
until just prior to the automatic lapsing of policies. “New cash” would then be 
used to cover the premiums due on the about-to-lapse policies. Sometimes the 
supervisor used the computer to generate “new cash” by submitting a file main­
tenance transaction to place the supervisor’s name on an active policy that had 
premiums paid to a certain date. The supervisor would then take an incoming 
check payment on another policy and apply it to the changed policy; a company 
check was automatically produced in the supervisor’s name with an explanation 
that the policy was overpaid. A tip from an employee initiated an audit that 
revealed the scheme. The scheme lasted two years, involved over 100 transac­
tions, and netted $30,000.
27. A policy service clerk had the authority to cross functional department 
lines to resolve problem cases requiring refunds or return of premiums. The 
clerk also had authority to initiate and approve disbursement requests. Using 
these authorities, the clerk initiated fraudulent premium refund requests and
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buried the transactions in various suspense accounts. The clerk also submitted 
override transactions to block automatic adjustments to commissions because 
of the premium refunds. Detection occurred when the operating management 
started reviewing old, suspended transactions. The scheme netted $17,000 over 
thirty-two months.
28. A policy service clerk normally received a computer printout showing 
the cash surrender values of policies that had lapsed for nonpayment of premi­
ums. The clerk introduced file maintenance transactions to place certain poli­
cies back into an active status on the master policy file (always selecting poli­
cies with a policyholder name similar to the perpetrator’s). The clerk then 
submitted transactions to produce checks for the policy equity cash value and 
deposited the checks in an account. The clerk subsequently came forward and 
revealed the fraudulent activity, which lasted for ten months and amounted to 
$6 ,000.
29. To make loan delinquencies appear to be within the established guide­
lines, a mortgage loan manager used a computer terminal and entered file main­
tenance transactions to manipulate mortgage loan due dates. Having success­
fully accomplished this scheme, the manager then began using the terminal to 
establish fraudulent loans. The total financial manipulation exceeded 
$320,000, with $55,000 actually converted to cash over a period of nine 
months. The schemes were uncovered during a routine annual audit.
30. A senior claim processor with signature authority issued claim checks to 
a fictitious payee that were later forged and deposited in a bank account. To 
conceal each fraudulent claim check, the processor prepared and sent a data 
entry code sheet to data processing, which recorded the issued check in the dis­
bursement and statistical claim information files. The processor then destroyed 
copies of the coding sheets which should have gone into the claim files. The 
fraud was detected when the processor coded a sheet incorrectly causing a mis­
match between the disbursement file and a cancelled check. The fraud lasted 
sixteen months and exceeded $110,000.
31. In a five-year period, a claim supervisor converted about $500,000 by 
submitting false health claims that generated checks payable to special payees 
or outside accomplices covered by group health contracts. The supervisor’s po­
sition provided access to other people’s passwords and negated some of the seg­
regation of duties controls passwords create. In some cases, the supervisor gave 
fraudulent claim papers to clerks to process in the course of their work and later 
destroyed the papers. In other cases, the supervisor used a terminal to add 
names to the eligibility file and then entered fraudulent claim data. Detection 
occurred when the perpetrator of another fraud told an internal auditor that this 
might be going on.
32. A group pension supervisor had complete control over payment transac­
tions and related correspondence with contract holders and claimants. The su­
pervisor initiated fraudulent lump-sum payment requests for eighteen months. 
The computer control to detect duplicate payments was based on a comparison 
of social security numbers, which the supervisor circumvented by transposing
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the social security numbers of the fraudulent payments. The fraud, which ex­
ceeded $400,000, was revealed when a legitimate retiree requested a lump-sum 
benefit and a clerk remembered seeing a previous claim payment to the retiree.
33. A policy service supervisor submitted file maintenance transactions to 
change the name and address fields on valid master policy record files to those 
of family members. The supervisor then prepared coded input documents to 
authorize fictitious premium refunds amounting to over $14,000. Once the 
computer-generated refunds were made, the perpetrator restored the correct 
data on the changed policy records. The fraud, which lasted four months, was 
detected in the bank reconciliation process when a clerk, instructed to review 
checks for unusual items, noticed a series of large amounts to the same payees 
and addresses.
34. A producer, working with a policy service clerk as an accomplice, cre­
ated bogus policies and manipulated valid ones to obtain loans and the full an­
nualized commissions when only one monthly premium was paid. The perpe­
trators used error correction routines to prevent recovery of the annualized 
commissions when the bogus policies were cancelled. In addition, fictitious 
premium “paid-to” date entries were made to increase case equities. The per­
petrators then submitted policy loan requests for the increased cash equity and 
negotiated checks that were made payable to the insured. The schemes lasted 
five years and netted $300,000. Detection occurred when the producer com­
plained about a commission payment, which aroused a supervisor’s suspicion.
35. A policy service supervisor responsible for the dividend unit created 
fictitious dividend payments by submitting requests with bogus policy num­
bers; the checks were mailed to an outside accomplice. When the check was 
authorized by the supervisor, the check data automatically created the account­
ing entry and simultaneously updated the master policy file. Because a bogus 
number was involved, an update of the policy file would reject and the transac­
tion would appear on an error report that was returned to the supervisor for in­
vestigation. Apparently, these listings were subsequently destroyed by this in­
dividual. The scheme was discovered accidentally during a routine review of 
dividend transactions at the corporate office. It lasted thirty months and netted 
$150,000.
36. A policy service clerk introduced file maintenance transactions to can­
cel active policies, which produced policyholder cancellation notices and pre­
mium refund checks. The clerk destroyed the cancellation notices and forged 
the refund checks. The clerk then followed a special error correction procedure 
to reinstate the policies with full coverage. This scheme was detected through a 
non-routine study of paid checks in which an employee noticed many out-of- 
state policyholders had apparently cashed their checks locally. The scheme 
lasted one year and netted $25,000.
37. A policy change clerk with access to an on-line terminal entered name 
and address changes to alter the policy master file records to the clerk’s spouse. 
Using general ledger transactions, the clerk caused refund checks to be mailed 
to the spouse. The refund accounting entry was entered into a general ledger
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suspense account not adequately controlled at the time. Detection was made 
when a supervisor routinely reviewed the suspense account for old items. The 
scheme netted $5,000 in four months.
38. A group dental claim processor obtained the names of covered employ­
ees from a co-conspirator employee of a policyholder company. Using a termi­
nal, the clerk entered fictitious claims made payable to the covered employees, 
but mailed to a post office box. The checks were obtained, signatures forged, 
and proceeds ($30,000 in twenty-one months) split. The fraud was detected 
when the claim clerk was absent and a replacement clerk routinely called a den­
tist for verification of the nature of a claim.
39. Three claim processors, using terminals, entered fictitious claim data 
causing computer-produced checks to be sent to each other’s home addresses. 
The supervisor had lunch with one of the perpetrators who mentioned that one 
of the other perpetrators, now an ex-employee, was being investigated for den­
tal claim frauds by the new employer. The supervisor initiated an audit of the 
claims processed by the informer and the ex-employee; the audit eventually dis­
closed the three perpetrators. This scheme lasted for sixteen months and netted 
$80,000.
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